Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937)

Facts

The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila newspapers that he would order the issuance of postage stamps for the commemoration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress celebration in the City of Manila. The said event was organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the petitioner, is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, requested Vicente Sotto who is a member of the Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the President. The said stamps in consideration were actually issued already and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress


Held:

No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and selling the commemorative postage stamps. Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052, which contemplates no religious purpose in view, giving the Director of Posts the discretion to determine when the issuance of new postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not intended by Ruiz to favor a particular church or denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of issuing of the stamps was to actually take advantage of an international event considered to be a great opportunity to give publicity to the Philippines and as a result attract more tourists to the country. In evaluating the design made for the stamp, it showed the map of the Philippines instead of showing a Catholic chalice. The focus was on the location of the City of Manila, and it also bore the inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” In considering these, it is evident that there is no violation of the Constitution therefore the act of the issuing of the stamps is constitutional.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.

Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 669 (1986)

FACTS:
       Ferdinand E. Marcos who was deposed from his seat through the EDSA people power revolution was forced into exile in 1986. When Marcos was dying, he wished to return to the country along with his family. However, Pres. Aquino, the president under the revolutionary governement, stood in his way and contended that Marcos cannot return to the country considering that his return would be a threat to the stability of the government and the country’s economy which was just beginning to rise and moving forward.

       The Marcoses assert that their right to return to the country is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution and that under the international law, the right of Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

ISSUE:
       Whether or not, in the excercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

HELD:
       It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the rigth to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under the international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International covenant on Civil and Political rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the rigth to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rigths.

      The right to return to one's country is not among the rights sepecifically guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate form the right to travel and enjoys a different  protection under the International Covenant and  Political Rights, i.e. against being "arbitrarily depprived" thereof.

       The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "the prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people and that "the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blesings of democracy."

      Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare essentially ideals to guide governmental action. but such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the excercise of the presidential  functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the president has to consider these principles, among  other things, and adhere to them.

      Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More thatn that, having sworn to defend and uphold the constitution, the President had the obligation under the constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government excercising the powers to delegate by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the constitution reminds everyone that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."

      The resoultion of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor flexible. For the excercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and of expression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests.

      To the President, the problem  is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the excercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the president but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.

      More particularly, this case calls for the excercise of  President's power as protector of the peace. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to the commanding in chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extrordinary powers in times of emergency, but it is also tasked with attending to day-to-day problems of maintenaing peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounce of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in anyway diminished by the relative of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President's excercising as commander-in-chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the priviledge of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, inorder to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.

      That the President has the power under the Constittution to bar the Marcoses from returning has been recognized by memebers of the legislatrue, and is manifested by the resolution porposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its memebers urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconcilliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising  respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws." The Resolution does not question the President's power  to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.

      What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing the liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropiately address to those unresidual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the excercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

      The Court cannot close its eyes to this present realities and pretend that the country is not biseiged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, righties conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolster the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would exacerbate and intensify the violence directed agaisnt the State and instigate more chaos.

      As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military establishement hs given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by paricular groups. But it is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may probe to be proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back.

      With thse before her , the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the marcoses poses a serious threat to the national inteset and welfare  and in prohbiting their return.

     It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of violence agaisnt the State, that would be the time for the President to step in and excercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the Governement, is not precluded from taking the pre-emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of governement.

      The preservation of the State - the fruition of the people's sovereignty - is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preseve and defend the constitution and to see the faithful executioin of the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.

      We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Governement has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, we cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed  on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcoses regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespreads poverty and all its attendants ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.

      The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.

Dissenting: Gutierez, Jr. J.

Section 6 of the Bill of Rights state categorically that the liberty of abode and of changing the same with limits prescribed by law may be impaired only upon lawful order of the court. Not by an executive officer. Not even by the President. Sec 6 further provides that the right to travel, and this obviously includes to travel out of or back in to the Philippines, cannot be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 153 (1999)

FACTS:
        Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City wnet to the police station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow, resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated discussion at the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.

ISSUES:
       1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.

       2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor of the accused.

HELD:
       1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made.

       The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications (Ramirez v Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

       2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the accused, constituted sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, annoying or irritating someone. The provocation must be sufficient and must immediately precede the act; and in order to be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must be accordingly proportionate in gravity. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong must also be considered. The exclamations made by Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him showed that he had no intent to kill the latter.

Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

[GR L-69809, 16 October 1986]

FACTS:
        Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico after demanding P 8,000.00 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).

ISSUE:
       Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that its use to overheard a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication between two parties using a telephone line.

HELD:
      No. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone or dictagraph, or other devvices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. this section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

      Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly  in favor of the accused. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case,  on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone.

      A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities  or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listeneing , in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or other similar nature.

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)

The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescrbied by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceeding section, shall inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

FACTS:
           Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.

HELD:
       Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injuction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or which public safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

      The intimacies between husband and wife  do not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infedility. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

      The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.